Was There a ‘Race to the Bottom’ After Welfare Reform? by Burns, Sarah K.
University of Kentucky 
Center for 
Poverty Research
Discussion Paper Series
DP 2012-04
UKCPR
University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, 302D Mathews Building, Lexington, KY, 40506-0047
Phone: 859-257-7641; Fax: 859-257-6959; E-mail: ukcpr@uky.edu
www.ukcpr.org
ISSN: 1936-9379
EO/AA
Was There a ‘Race to the Bottom’ After Welfare 
Reform?
Sarah K. Burns
Department of Economics
and
Center for Poverty Research 
University of Kentucky 
September 9, 2012
Preferred citation
Burns, Sarah K., Was There a ‘Race to the Bottom’ After Welfare Reform?. University of Kentucky Center for 
Poverty Research Discussion Paper Series, DP2012-04. Retrieved [Date] from http://www.ukcpr.org/Publica-
tions/DP2012-03.pdf.
Author correspondence 
 Sarah K. Burns, Center for Poverty Research, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506-0047; Email: 
sarah.burns2@uky.edu; Phone: 859-608-0695
Was there a ‘Race to the Bottom’ After Welfare Reform?
Sarah K. Burns ∗
Department of Economics and Center for Poverty Research
University of Kentucky
September 9, 2012
Abstract
Leading up to the passage of the 1996 welfare reform, there was much speculation and
debate over the possibility that states would “race to the bottom” in setting welfare
generosity if given more control over their individual programs. In the fifteen years
after welfare reform, did such a race to the bottom ensue? Using a spatial dynamic
econometric approach I investigate welfare competition across multiple policy instru-
ments and across three distinct welfare periods – the AFDC regime, the experimental
waiver period leading up to the reform, and the TANF era. Results suggest strategic
policy setting occurs over multiple dimensions of welfare including the effective bene-
fit level and the effective tax rate applied to recipient’s earned income. Furthermore,
strategic behavior appears to have increased over time consistent with a race to the
bottom after welfare reform. However, once controlling for own past policies, little
evidence of cross-state strategic policy setting is found for the maximum benefit level.
Keywords: Fiscal competition; Strategic interaction; Welfare reform; Spatial econo-
metrics
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“It seems ironical in the light of the proceeding treatment of principles (or guidelines)
for fiscal federalism to find that welfare reform is the vanguard of U.S. moves toward fiscal
decentralization.” Oates (1999)
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
abolished the federal entitlement program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a state administered
block-grant program. In doing so, the federal government granted states much greater lat-
itude in the design of their respective welfare programs. Leading up to the passage of the
reform there was much speculation and debate over the possibility that states would use their
new found freedom to “race to the bottom” in setting welfare generosity. Canonical models
of fiscal federalism have long suggested that income redistribution, specifically in the form of
assistance to the poor, should fall into the realm of responsibility of the federal government
(Stigler (1957), Musgrave (1959), Oates (1972)).1 With welfare, it has been argued that
decentralized benefit-setting could trigger competition among the states. In such a scenario,
policy makers fear that they may attract poor populations from neighboring states, or be-
come a ‘welfare magnet,’ if relatively generous benefits are offered. To avoid this outcome,
states may strategically reduce the generosity of their welfare programs and compete with
neighbors to offer less desirable benefits.
To gauge the likelihood of this scenario, researchers began looking for evidence of
competitive behavior among states before the reform went into effect (Brueckner (2000),
Figlio et al. (1999), Shroder (1995), Rom et al. (1998), Saavedra (2000)).2 However, little is
actually known about the extent of strategic competition after welfare reform. In effect, the
question ‘did welfare reform actually kick off a race to the bottom?’ remains unanswered.
Understanding state behavior following the reform is especially relevant today given growing
political pressures to further reform the social safety net and specifically the current propos-
als that would block grant funding and give states more control over additional programs
including medicaid and the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP). Using
dynamic spatial econometric methods, this paper provides the first evidence on competition
after the 1996 reform.
Because of the large array of new policies available to state policy makers (time limits,
family caps, sanctions, earnings disregards, etc.), a test of welfare competition that simply
1While the mobility of individuals generally leads one to view local governments as constrained in the
amount of redistribution they can carry out, this normative position has not gone unchallenged. Under
certain assumptions, some have shown local redistribution to be efficient (Pauly (1973), Epple and Romer
(1991)).
2The focus of these studies was the AFDC statutory maximum benefit level which was determined at the
state level.
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extended past methodologies over the TANF era would miss many dimensions over which
states could conceivably compete. While the statutory benefit level remains a policy instru-
ment readily available for reform, the water is muddied by the numerous other instruments
states now have at their disposal. If states have in fact engaged in a “race to the bot-
tom”, it is entirely possible that they did so through more restrictive access, greater policy
stringency, or some combination of these and other factors. I extend the past literature by
utilizing micro caseload data to construct a unique panel of state level welfare policy vari-
ables. These include the effective benefit level, the effective tax rate on recipients earned
income, state sanction use, and ease of access to benefits. Taken together these variables
more fully encompass a state’s welfare policy bundle and the channels through which they
might compete.
A second contribution of the analysis aims to more fully understand the evolution
of competitive behavior surrounding the reform. Though the PWRORA legislation marked
the official transition from AFDC to TANF, implementation was not instantaneous. The
two regimes were separated by an experimental period of ‘laboratory federalism.’3 The
existence of such a period provides a unique opportunity for investigating changes in intensity
of strategic behavior. Specifically, during the experimental “waiver period,” states had
additional policy freedoms but were not yet bound by the new TANF provisions and financing
arrangements. To exploit the changing policy landscape, I analyze strategic policy setting
over a twenty-five year window (1983-2008) divided into three distinct periods: the AFDC
era (1983-1991); the experimental waiver period (1992-1996); and the post reform TANF
regime (1997-2008). Through this division I can test for changes in the intensity of strategic
behavior across the different regimes.
Finally, though the the importance of dynamics has been recognized in the welfare
caseload literature (Ziliak et al. (2000), Haider and Klerman (2005)), the welfare competition
literature has largely ignored the importance of dynamics in the determination of welfare
policy. To address this matter, I further extend the literature by providing the first dynamic
estimates of welfare competition. To do so, I adopt a spatial dynamic panel estimator
which permits both short and long run estimates of strategic policy setting. The dynamic
specification can be rationalized on several grounds. First, there likely exist lags in the
diffusion of information about changes in neighbors’ welfare policy. Second, the political
process takes time. States wishing to enact policy changes in response to their neighbors’
3A provision of the Social Security Act, dating back to 1962, permitted the secretary of Health and Human
Services to waive the rules and regulations surrounding AFDC in certain contexts. Specifically, states had
the power to petition the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for such waivers allowing them
to implement experimental programs or policies designed to increase program effectiveness(Grogger and
Karoly (2005)).
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policies may not be able to do so immediately. Third, state welfare policies are highly
persistent (Ziliak et al. (2000), Haider and Klerman (2005)) and failing to control for last
years policies, or state dependence, may lead one to overstate the magnitude of strategic
behavior. Through the addition of dynamics, one is provided a better understanding of the
importance played by strategic behavior in the determination of state policy over time.
The static model shows that states strategically set welfare policies in conjunction
with those of their neighbors. Moreover, this strategic behavior was not limited to the
statutory benefit level examined by the past literature. Rather, it spanned multiple policy
instruments affecting the effective benefits level and tax rates faced by recipients in each
state, consistent with competition over the benefit base. Furthermore, it appears strate-
gic behavior intensified in the waiver and TANF periods. For instance, during the AFDC
regime, estimates suggest states responded to a 10% cut in the effective benefit level of their
neighbors’ with an own cut of around 8.5%. This magnitude increased to 9% and then 9.3%
for the waiver and TANF periods, respectively. When the models are augmented to allow
for asymmetrical policy responses (i.e. states’ responses are conditioned on their relative
position to their neighbors), I find that states offering relatively generous policies are more
responsive to cuts in generosity by bordering states as one would expect in a “race to the
bottom” scenario (Figlio et al. (1999)). Furthermore, the three period analysis reveals that
the asymmetrical response behavior is concentrated in the waiver and TANF regimes.
Finally, the results demonstrate the importance of modeling welfare competition in
a dynamic framework. In terms of importance, lagged own state policy variables clearly
dominate those of neighbors for short run policy determination. Spatial coefficients, which
capture a state’s reaction to its neighbor’s policies, are reduced in economic importance and
in some instances lose statistical significance under the dynamic specification. Most notable
is the case of the maximum benefit level. Once controlling for a states’ lagged own maximum
benefit level, the maximum benefit level of bordering states no longer appears to exert much
influence on state policy choice. However, evidence of strategic policy setting in both the
short and long run remains for many of the new variables under consideration, especially
the effective benefit level and the effective tax rate on earned income. Long run coefficients
suggest that neighbor policy does play an important role in a state’s determination of welfare
policy over time. Sensitivity analysis reveals findings are robust to multiple spatial weighting
schemes and specification choices.
2. Welfare reform and the “race to the bottom”
The PRWORA legislation, now commonly referred to as welfare reform, sought to “end
welfare as we know it.” As outlined in Blank (2002), the major reform provisions included
3
the devolution of greater policy authority to the states, the change in financing, ongoing work
requirements, incentives to reduce non-marital births, and a five year maximum time-limit.
Of these provisions, the first and second were central to the “race to the bottom” debate.
a. Greater policy authority for the states
Under TANF, states were given increased discretion over eligibility, the form and level of
benefits, and the ability to impose even more stringent time limits and work requirements if
they so chose (Blank (2002), Grogger and Karoly (2005)). While many of the new policies
were designed to force participants to work and punish or sanction those who did not comply,
others were implemented to increase the reward to working. Examples of the latter included
reduced statutory tax rates on recipient’s income as well as expansions in earnings disregards
and liquid asset limits which determined benefit levels and eligibility (Ziliak (2007)). These
so called “carrots and sticks” of welfare reform were applied at the discretion of each state
and entered into use during the early 1990s in the experimental waiver period.
Wavier-based reforms that had gone largely unused until the 1990s suddenly became
a key mechanism in the states’ push for reform. During this time, eighty-three waivers were
granted to forty-three states and the District of Columbia (Grogger and Karoly (2005)).4
For example, 16 states were granted approval to implement various statewide time-limit
policies. Of these, Iowa was the first state to receive approval in 1993. Other midwestern
states to adopt time-limit waivers included Indiana (1994), Nebraska and Illinois (1995) and
Ohio (1996). Connecticut implemented the strictest time-limit policy of 21 months which
applied to the whole family. Delaware, Virginia, and South Carolina also received approval
for strict full family time-limits of 24 months. Statewide family-cap waivers were granted
to 19 states between 1992-1996. The majority of these allowed no increase in benefits for
additional children beyond a certain number. Statewide financial-incentive waivers were
granted in 20 states over the same period. Before the waiver period, welfare recipients
faced a benefit reduction ratio of 100% after just four months of working.5 In an attempt to
encourage labor force participation or “make work pay,” states experimented with increasing
the income disregard and lowering the implicit tax rate. Michigan, for instance, allowed a
$200 disregard and lowered the tax rate on earned income to 20% while Connecticut allowed
recipients to keep 100% of their earnings up until the federal poverty line. These constitute
just a few of the examples of policies states initially enacted during the waiver period and
carried over to TANF. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the evolution of U.S. welfare reform, it
4The following information on specific state waiver policies is drawn from Chapter 2 of Grogger and Karoly
(2005).
5AFDC’s first finical work incentive, known as the “$30-and-a third” policy, was enacted in 1967 but later
eliminated in 1981 for recipients with four months of work.
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was not only these new waivers state policymakers pushed for in the final national reform.
They also sought the devolution of responsibility in program design from the federal level to
the state.
Naturally, some believed this new found flexibility in welfare design would prove
efficiency enhancing, as states could now tailor their programs to meet their citizens’ (both
tax-payers and potential recipients) wants and needs more closely. Others, however, were
concerned that the further decentralization of benefits would have a more worrisome effect –
the aggravation of interjurisdictional externalities suggested by the fiscal federalism tradition.
While popular usage of the term “race to the bottom” tends to overstate the situation or
connote “a draconian tendency to slash welfare benefits to the bare minimum, mimicking the
outcome of the least generous state,” the fact remains that economic theory does point to
a downward bias in generosity (Brueckner (2000)). This benefit under-provision result has
been demonstrated in the literature many times. The standard models of benefit competition,
built on the work of Brown and Oates (1987), Bucovetsky (1991), and Wildasin (1991) consist
of multiple jurisdictions composed of taxpayers and mobile poor non-taxpayers who receive
a welfare benefit. The welfare benefit is selected in each jurisdiction to maximize the utility
of the taxpayers (who care about the poor in their own jurisdiction) taking into account
the benefit level in other jurisdictions. First order conditions from these models take on the
form of a Samuelson condition for the optimal provision of a public good where the sum of
the taxpayers marginal utility gain from increasing the benefit is equal to the marginal cost.
The suboptimality of this result is easily demonstrated by obtaining the same condition for
the case in which the poor are immobile. Comparison reveals that the marginal cost of
raising benefits will be higher when the poor can migrate which leads to a lower benefit level
than in the no migration case. Thus decentralized benefit setting is said to lead to benefit
under-provision.
To test this prediction, the past welfare competition literature focused on the max-
imum AFDC benefit guarantee (sometimes augmented to include food stamps) for a given
family size. However, this statutory maximum may not sufficiently reflect a state’s welfare
policy. Under welfare reform, other critical factors include the rates at which states ‘claw
back’ benefits as a recipient’s income increases along with the levels and sources of income
that may be excluded from benefit determination formula (Ziliak (2007)). These factors
which are determined by state policy act to drive a wedge between the statutory maximum
benefit level and the prevailing average effective benefit. Figure 1 illustrates this by plotting
the time series trend for the average statutory maximum and average effective benefit level
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for a family of three.6 For both variables a clear downward trend emerges in the late 1980s,
which is consistent with welfare competition. Even more interesting is the divergence be-
tween effective and statutory benefit guarantees whose onset coincides with the 1996 reform.
Ziliak (2007) notes that the falling effective guarantees make welfare less attractive and are in
line with the reform goals of encouraging work and discouraging welfare use. One could also
speculate that these falling effective guarantees are consistent with states’ strategic efforts
to keep their welfare programs from appearing to be more desirable than their neighbors.
Though the effective benefit level may better reflect a state’s generosity relative to the statu-
tory maximum, the picture is not complete until one considers the effective tax rates faced by
recipients. The effective tax rate on earned income reflects the rate at which a state reduces
the monthly benefit amount paid to recipients as they earn labor income. State policies
such as reduced statutory rates and earnings disregards, lower the effective rate of taxation
and thus increase both the level of generosity and work incentives. Before the reform, this
tax rate had a statutory value of 100% though in practice it was much lower and displayed
a considerable degree of cross-state heterogeneity (Lurie (1974), Hutchens (1978), Franker
et al. (1985), McKinnish (2007)). After the reform, the rates fell rapidly as seen in Figure
2. A strong case can be made for the use of these ‘effective’ variables. Though they cannot
separately identify the individual policies, these variables will reflect a states’ collective use
of policies such as family caps, asset limits, partial sanctions and earning disregards, as well
as caseworker discretion in the application of these policies (Ziliak (2007)).
However, there is also an extensive margin of generosity to consider. States can
set strict eligibility criteria, harsh sanction policies, or shorter more restrictive time limits.
Three additional measures therefore aim to capture aspects of state policy not represented
by the benefit and tax rate instruments discussed above. The first is the approval rate
which is meant to proxy for ease of access to welfare benefits. The latter two reflect a
state’s stringency in terminating cases through the use of sanction and other non-sanction
state polices (such as shortened time limits). These measures are constructed using micro
caseload data available only for the post-reform regime. Figure 3 illustrates a national trend
towards declining case approval rates coinciding with an increasing trend in case termination
due to sanctions. Specifically, average state case approvals fell approximately 17% between
2000 and 2008 while sanction use nearly doubled. Overall, the trends documented here
suggest a tendency towards reducing welfare generosity along multiple margins consistent
with a race to the bottom. Detailed information on the construction of all variables and
their sources are provided in the data section.
6The effective benefit variable is constructed using administrative micro caseload data from the AFDC
Quality Control System and the National TANF Data System. See data section for further detail.
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The additional policy autonomy for the states was not the only factor cited in the
growing debate on whether states would “race to the bottom.” Critics of the reform also
argued that the new cost-sharing arrangement between states and the federal government
would exert further downward pressure on benefits.
b. Change in federal cost sharing
Brueckner (2000) demonstrated that a price correction mechanism, such as a system of
matching grants with the federal government, can be used to decrease the price of additional
welfare spending and restore benefits to their optimal level. Such a system was in existence
prior to PRWORA. The reform, however, replaced this cost-sharing scheme with a block
grant system. With the old system of open-ended matching grants, states would share any
increase in their costs with the federal government (sometimes with the federal government
footing as much as 80% of the bill).7 Under TANF, states receive a lump sum block grant
which was initially tied to the level of federal matching-grant payments a state received in
1994 (Brueckner (2000)).8 As noted in Rom et al. (1998), each state therefore bears the
full marginal cost of any increased spending in its welfare program. Alternatively, states
gain the full marginal benefit of any cost savings they incur. In such a setting, attracting
welfare migrants from low-benefit states would be quite costly, and more so than before.
Consequently, it was suggested that welfare competition could intensify post reform, speeding
up the race to the bottom (or at least the race to the benefit floor required by federal law).
Policy makers, perhaps in anticipation of strong downward pressure on benefits levels, set
“maintenance of effort” requirements stipulating that states may not spend less than 80%
of what they spent in 1994 (or 75% if they meet minimum work requirements).9
While theory suggests the move towards greater state policy authority and block
grant financing could have led states to under provide or even “race to the bottom” in setting
their welfare generosity, assessing the importance of any resulting competitive behavior is
an empirical matter.
7Under AFDC, the federal matching rate for each state was calculated based on the state’s per capita
personal income (PCI). The specific formula, match rate= 100 − .45 ∗ (StatePCI)
2
U.S.PCI , was the same formula
used to determined the Medicaid matching rate and was designed to give relatively poorer states more
federal assistance.
8The amount of the block grants was not tied to inflation. Between 1997 and 2011, the value of these grants
has been eroded by nearly 30%
9Like the block grants, MOE requirements were not indexed for inflation and have thus greatly declined.
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c. Empirical tests of “race to the bottom”
Because welfare migration is held to be the key mechanism in race to the bottom theory,
initial empirical studies sought to test whether or not migration actually occurred at any
meaningful magnitude. These studies however found rather mixed results.10 The lack of
conclusive results confirming welfare migration does not prima facie rule out race to the
bottom behavior. As explained by Brueckner (2000), if state governments merely perceive
generous welfare benefits to attract welfare migrants, then the requirements for strategic
interaction and the resulting race to the bottom are met. He therefore argues, “because it
focuses directly on the behavioral response that leads to a race to the bottom, which may
arise even if welfare migration is mostly imaginary, a test for strategic interaction may be
more useful than a test for migration itself.”
The canonical approach is to employ a fiscal reaction function that relates the welfare
benefit level in one state to the benefit level in surrounding states, conditional on a state’s
socioeconomic conditions (the poverty rate, female unemployment rate, state per capita
personal income, population, governor’s political party, etc.). Equation (1) represents the
typical model,
bi = φ
∑
j 6=i
ωijbj +Xiβ + εi (1)
Here bi represents the benefit level in state i, while bj is the benefit level in all other states
j, where j 6= i. Xi is a matrix of controls for state i, β, its accompanying coefficient vector,
and εi is an error term. The weights, or importance, state i attaches to the benefit levels
in other states make up the ωij vector. Lastly, φ is the parameter representing the slope of
the reaction function. This parameter will take a non-zero value in the presence of strategic
interaction.
To estimate equation (1) an a priori set of weights that determines the pattern of in-
teraction between state i and their neighbor’s must be specified. Consequently, the question
as to which states should be considered neighbors is an important one. In related literatures
investigating strategic tax and expenditure policy setting, “economic” neighbors (which are
not necessarily geographic neighbors) have been defined based criteria such as racial com-
position or income (Case et al. (1993)). However, because welfare migration (or the fear of
welfare migration) is the main factor behind strategic interaction, it is natural to assume
a state will be most concerned with the policies of their geographic neighbors - arguably
10See Brueckner (2000) for a survey covering empirical studies of welfare migration. More recent works
finding evidence of moderate welfare migration include McKinnish (2004, 2007), and Gelbach (2004).
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more so, than in related literatures when strategic interaction is driven by capital mobility.11
Therefore, my initial weight matrix, WI, is a simple contiguity matrix where each state as-
signs a weight of zero to noncontiguous states (ωij = 0) and equal weights (ωij = 1/ni) to
bordering states where ni is the number of states contiguous to i. Because one’s geographic
neighbors remain unchanged, the weights for each state will be time invariant. All baseline
models are estimated with this simple weighting scheme. Weighting schemes in which a
state scales the importance they attribute to neighbors based on population and distance
are explored in the sensitivity analysis and discussed therein.
Because benefit levels in different states are believed to be jointly determined, the
inclusion of benefit levels on the right side of equation (1) creates an endogeneity problem that
must be addressed in estimation. Common methods include reduced form estimation using
Maximum Likelihood (ML) spatial econometric techniques and an instrumental variable
approach. Past studies of AFDC benefit competition employing the reduced form approach
include Saavedra (2000) and Rom et. al (1998).12 Both author’s estimate versions of what
has become known in the literature as the spatial lag model with some key distinctions.
Specifically, Saavedra’s model is adopted to allow errors to follow a spatially autocorrelated
process and is applied to several cross sections (1985, 1990, and 1995). Rom et al. (1998) use
a panel of data covering 1976-1994. They include a temporal lag of AFDC benefits among
their control variables in order to address contemporaneously correlated errors but do not
take into account spatial error correlation.13 In both studies, estimates of φ, the slope of
the reaction function are positive and statistically significant. One drawback with this type
of econometric approach is the need to impose restrictions on the reaction function’s slope
parameter.14 Another is the fact the ML spatial methods require the inversion of the spatial
weight matrix which can be computationally demanding (Kukenova and Monteiro (2009),
Kelejian and Prucha (1998), Lee (2007)).
Figlio et al. (1999) use a two-stage IV approach to investigate the extent of strategic
interaction present among states over the period 1983 to 1994.15 Neighbor’s benefits are in-
11Saavedra (2000) argued that a state will be more fearful of attracting welfare migrants from nearby states
due to both information issues and the fact that migration costs grow with distance.
12This method requires inverting the model given by (1). Specifically, one takes the matrix form of (1) given
by B = φWB + Xβ + ε and solves for B which yields the reduced form equation B = (I − φW )−1Xβ +
(I − φW )−1ε. The equation can then be estimated using ML techniques assuming (I − φW ) is invertable.
13Under the reduced form approach, failing to account for spatial error correlation can result in spurious
evidence of welfare competition. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable introduces further econo-
metric issues which are not addressed in Rom et al. (1998) but are in the current paper.
14Consistent and efficient estimation of model parameters with MLE requires the structure of the interaction
given by the product of φ and W in the reduced form model to be nonexplosive. In the usual case, φ must
be less than one in absolute value.
15While two-stage IV methods may be inefficient relative to ML methods, they have the advantage of being
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strumented with the weighted average of a subset of neighbor covariates, a common approach
in the literature. Substantial evidence in favor of strategic benefit setting is found. Evidence
of asymmetric responses to changes in neighbors benefits levels are also found. Specifically,
states appear to respond much stronger when neighbors cut benefits and less so when they
increase them. Evidence of benefit competition has not been limited to the U.S.. Using sim-
ilar methodologies Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) and Fiva and Ratts (2006) find evidence
consistent with a race to the bottom in Swedish and Norweigen municipalities respectively.
See Figure 4 for details regarding the weighting schemes, data choice, estimation technique
and findings for these past benefit competition studies. In addition to the studies included in
Figure 4, Shroder (1995), Berry et al. (2003), and Bailey and Rom (2004) also addressed the
question of interstate welfare competition using somewhat different econometric approaches.
Of these studies, Bailey and Rom (2004) is the only to produce strong evidence of strategic
welfare competition.
3. Estimation Issues
As previously discussed, the welfare competition literature has largely ignored the importance
of dynamics in the determination of welfare policy. In part, this is likely due to the fact that
spatial estimators capable of providing proper econometric treatment to both an endogenous
spatial term and a lagged dependent variable have only recently become available. Also, some
of the initial tests for welfare competition which sought to sign the slope of the theoretically
ambiguous reaction functions were preformed with cross sectional data. However, because a
states welfare policies are likely as much a function of time as they are of space, a dynamic
framework is required to identify the importance of strategic interaction in the determination
of state welfare policies.
This analysis implements a dynamic estimator new to the welfare competition liter-
ature. Specifically, I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed
by Blundell and Bond (1998) that has become increasingly popular in the empirical litera-
ture dealing with spatial dynamic panel models with several endogenous variables.16 I begin
with a basic empirical model of strategic interaction similar to those previously discussed
augmented to include a lagged dependent variable.
computationally simpler and avoid strong assumptions on the normality of the error term (Lee (2007)).
Also IV produces results which are robust to the presence of spatial error correlation.
16Kukenove and Monteiro (2009) and Jabobs et al. (2009) both consider the extension of the Blundell Bond
(1998) estimator for the estimation of models with spatially lagged dependent variables. Monte Carlo
simulations show the estimator performs well in terms of bias and RMSE and that the system GMM
estimator outperforms the Arrelano and Bond difference estimator. Papers applying the System GMM
estimator to spatial panels include Madariaga and Poncet (2007), Foucault et al. (2008), Wren and Jones
(2011), Bartolini and Santolini (2011), and Neumayer and de Soysa (2011).
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Yit = γYit−1 + φ
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt +Xitβ + αi + δt + εit (2)
Here Yit represents each of the six welfare policy instruments under investigation for state i
in time t. Yjt represents these policies in all other states j at time t, where j 6= i. State fixed
effects, time effects, and the i.i.d error term are denoted by αi, δt, and εit respectively. The
importance or weight assigned to state j by state i at time t (j 6= i) is represented by ωijt.
Note that the static model given by equation (1) is embedded within this equation
when γ = 0, or a state’s lagged policies are not included in the model. With the dynamic
model given by (2), one can obtain estimates of strategic policy setting for both the short
and long run. The estimate of strategic policy setting over the short run is given by the
coefficient, φ, while the long run coefficient is calculated using the short-run coefficient
and the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. Specifically, the long run coefficient
is equal to φ
1−γ .
17 Estimates of the short run coefficient, φ, capture the magnitude of a
state’s immediate policy reaction to those of its neighbors while long run coefficients capture
the policy adjustment process. Consequently, differences between the short and long run
estimates will be governed by the degree of policy persistence given by the parameter γ.
In order to remove the fixed effects (αi) which are correlated with the covariates and
the lagged dependent variable, equation (3) is first differenced and rewritten as:
∆Yit = γ∆Yit−1 + φ∆
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt + ∆Xitβ + ∆δt + ∆εit (3)
Though the data transformation removes the fixed effects, the lagged dependent variable
remains endogenous since the term Yi,t−1 included in ∆Yit−1 = Yi,t−1 − Yi,t−2 is correlated
with the εi,t−1 in ∆εit = εit − εit−1. So too does the neighbor’s jointly determined policy.
Finally, any predetermined covariates in X become potentially endogenous given that they
too may correlate with εi,t−1. Following the GMM procedure, one can instrument endogenous
regressors with deeper lags which remain orthogonal to the error. Under the assumption that
error term is not serially correlated, valid moment conditions for the endogenous variables
are given by conditions (4)-(6)
E[Yi,t−τ∆εit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T and 2 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1 (4)
17Standard error for the long run coefficient are obtained using Stata’s nlcom command. Calculations are
based on the delta method.
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E[Wi,t−τYi,t−τ∆εit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T and 2 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1 (5)
E[Xi,t−τ∆εit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T and 1 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1 (6)
Conditions (4) and (5) restrict the set of instruments for the change in own lagged policy,
∆Yi,t−1, and the change in neighbor’s policy, ∆
∑48
i 6=j ωijtYjt, to levels of their second lags or
earlier. Condition (6) requires predetermined covariates be instruments with their first lags or
earlier. Because lagged levels of variables can be weak instruments when a variable is highly
persistent (as is the case with the welfare variables), the system estimator of Blundell and
Bond (1998) adds the original levels equation given by (2) to the model with the additional
moment conditions:
E[∆Yi,t−τεit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T (7)
E[∆Wi,t−τYi,t−τεit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T (8)
E[∆Xi,t−τεit] = 0; for t = 2, ...T (9)
The regression in levels given by equation (2) and the regression in differences given by
(3) are combined into a system and estimated simultaneously with lagged levels serving as
instruments for the difference equation and lagged differences serving as instruments for the
levels equation in accordance with the moment conditions (4)-(9). The model is estimated
in natural logs allowing coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities.
The consistency of the GMM estimator will depend of on the validity of the instru-
ments. However, under the above moment conditions, the instrument count grows prolifically
in T creating problems in finite samples (Ziliak (1997)).18 To avoid these problems I fol-
low Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) and Jacobs et al. (2009) and collapse the instruments.19
Collapsed moment conditions differ from the those proposed in Arellano and Bond (1991)
where each moment applies to all available periods rather than a particular time period. For
instance, under this modification the moment condition given by (4) now appears as
E[Yi,t−τ∆εit] = 0; 2 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1 (10)
18The use of too many instruments will over fit an endogenous variable and result in poor estimation of the
optimal weighting matrix. Roodman(2009) notes it is not uncommon for the optimal weight matrix to
become singular and force the use of the generalized inverse.
19Collapsed instruments have also been used in the economic growth literature where dynamic panel models
of a similar cross-sectional and time dimensions are estimated. See for instance Cauldron et. al (2002),
Beck and Levine (2004), and Karcovic and Levine (2005).
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The new conditions still impose orthogonality, but now the conditions only hold for each τ
rather than for each t and τ. Collapsed instruments can be shown to lead to less biased esti-
mates but their standard errors tend to increase (Roodman (2006)). Two specification tests
are conducted to verify the validity of the chosen instrument set. Specifically, the Hansen
test for over identification is performed to verify instrument validity while the Arellano-Bond
test is performed to verify the the required assumptions on the absence of serial correlation
in the level residuals. The system estimator described above is used to obtain estimates of
φ, the reaction function slope parameter, for each of the six policy instruments across the
full sample period (1983-2008) and the three distant welfare periods - the AFDC regime,
Wavier period, and TANF era.
Allowing for asymmetrical policy responses
The idea that a state may respond differently to the policies of their neighbor’s given their
neighbor’s policy action (i.e. benefit increase versus benefit cut) or their relative position
(relatively generous or relatively stingy) has take hold in the welfare and more general fiscal
competition literature (Figlio (1999), Bailey and Rom (2004), Fredriksson and Millimet
(2002)). The premise has a clear intuitive appeal for researchers attempting to disentangle
whether competition or some other competing explanation (yardstick competition, copy-
catting, common intellectual trend) is driving the strategic policy behavior. Under the “race
to the bottom” scenario one could expect a benefit cut by one state to invoke a larger
policy response from neighbors offering relatively more generous benefits than neighbors
who already have a low benefit level. I therefore extend the model to allow for asymmetrical
state responses. Specifically, equation (2) is written as
Yit = γYi,t−1 + φ0Iit
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt + φ1(1− Iit)
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt +Xitβ + αi + δt + εit (11)
where
Iit =
{
1 if Yit >
∑
i 6=j ωijtYjt
0 otherwise
In doing so, I allow states to be differentially impacted by the changing welfare policies
of their neighbor’s conditioning on whether their benefits, tax rates, etc. are above or
below the weighted average of their neighbors. Under this specification, φ0 (φ1) gives the
strategic response of states with welfare policies higher (lower) than the weighted average of
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their neighbors. Wald tests are utilized to determine if response asymmetries are present.
Under the null hypothesis, φ0= φ1, state’s respond the same to a neighbor’s policy change
regardless of their relative position. Rejection of the null hypothesis is consistent with
response asymmetries.
4. Data
To estimate equations (2) and (11), I assemble a panel of data on state welfare policies,
demographics, and the macro economic and political environment for the years 1983-2008.
For the maximum benefit level I use the state set maximum AFDC (or TANF) benefit level
for a family of three collected from the UKCPR’s welfare database.20 To obtain state level
estimates of the effective benefit guarantees and tax rates, I implement the reduced-form
methodology of Ziliak (2007) which requires the use of administrative micro caseload data.21
With such data one regresses the actual AFDC/TANF benefit for recipient i = 1, ...N , in
state j = 1, ...J, at time t = 1, ...T on the recipient’s earned income, unearned/transfer
income and controls for the number of children. State specific and time-varying intercepts
combined with coefficients on variables indicating the presence of additional children provide
an estimate of the effective benefit guarantee for families of various sizes. The coefficient
on the recipients earned income is used to provide estimates of effective tax rates. The
caseload data used in constructing these estimates comes from two different administrative
sources. The first is the AFDC Quality Control System (AFDC-QC), which covers 1983-
1997, and the second is the National TANF Data System (NTDS), which covers 1998-2008.22
Summary statistics for the benefit and tax rate variables are presented in Table 1 for the
pooled sample and the three separate welfare periods. The geographic distribution of benefit
levels is illustrated by Figures 4a and 4b which map the maximum state benefit levels for
the AFDC and TANF periods. Looking at 5a, the AFDC map, one can see a clear pattern
of geographic clustering with the most generous benefits levels located in the New England
and west coast and the least generous located in the south. Moving to 5b, the TANF map,
one can see the map lighten as more states join the lower benefit levels.
The final three welfare measures are constructed from data available only for the
TANF period. The first of these is the approval rate which I define as the average monthly
20www.ukcpr.org/AvailableData.aspx
21I am grateful to Jim Ziliak for providing programs and data which allowed me to replicate and extend his
1983-2002 analysis through 2008.
22The NTDS is called the Emergency TANF Data System for the years 1998 and 1999. See Ziliak (2007) for
a detailed discussion of the micro data and sample selection criterion. The AFDC-QC data and codebooks
for 1983-1997 are available online at http://afdc.urban.org/ while the TANF 1998-2008 data are available
online at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ftp/hsp/tanf-data/index.shtml
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number of applications approved over the average monthly applications received.23 The
other two variables capture state strictness in removing people from the welfare roles. The
first, sanction use, is defined as the percent distribution of TANF closed-case families with
cases closed by sanctions. The final variable, non-sanction state policy, is defined as the
percent distribution of TANF case-closed families with cases closed by state-policy. Case
closure data comes from the Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recip-
ients database.24 Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table 1b. Their
geographic distributions are displayed in figure 6a-c. From the map, one can tell some states
- Idaho, Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, and Maryland, for example - appear very policy strin-
gent by displaying both low access rates and high sanction use. Other states, New York,
Pennsylvania, Utah, and Oregon, among others, appear more lenient with higher acceptance
rates and very low sanction use.
The control variables adopted for this analysis are those commonly found in the
empirical literature and are meant to capture aspects of each state’s economic and political
climate as well as characteristics of the low-skill and female labor market. Specifically I
control for population, the African American proportion of the population, the poverty rate,
the female unemployment rate, median wage, employment per capita, and an indicator for a
democratic governor. The African American proportion of the population, median wage, and
female unemployment rate are constructed from the Current Population Survey (CPS).25 The
remaining variables come from the UKCPR’s welfare database. All variables are measured
in 2007 dollars. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1c.
5. Results
All models are estimated in both a static and dynamic framework. I begin by presenting
the results for the benefit and tax rate variables over the full 1983-2008 period and then
the three separate welfare periods - AFDC, waiver, and TANF. Results for the remaining
variables (access, sanctions, and non sanction state policy) are reported separately as they
span a different time period (2000-2008). I report models with and without allowing for
response asymmetries. WYp denotes the spatial coefficient in the model without asymmetries,
where different policy instruments are indexed by p. For the model including asymmetries,
WYp(Iit) denotes the spatial coefficient for states with benefits, tax rates, etc. greater than
their neighbors on average, while WYp(1− Iit) is the response of states setting these policies
23The application data is available online for the years 2000-2010 at www.acf.hhs.gov/program/ofa/data-
reports/caseload/applications/application.htm
24Data available for the years 1998-2009 online at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/character/index.html
25To address the fact that samples sizes can be limited for subpopulations in smaller states, these variables
are constructed as three-year moving averages.
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lower than their neighbors on average. Wald tests are presented to indicate whether or not
response asymmetries are present. Hansen tests for over identification are presented for all
models and consistently fail to reject the null of valid instruments. The Arellono-Bond tests
for serial correlation and instrument counts are also reported.
The baseline models use the main contiguity weight matrix, WI. Endogenous spatial
variables are instrumented with their second through fourth lags collapsed in all initial
models while controls are treated as predetermined and instrumented with their first lag
collapse.26 Estimates of control variables are suppressed for ease of presentation. Full results
are available upon request.
a. Static Results
Table 2 presents the full period analysis. Evidence of strategic state policy setting is found
across all benefit and tax rate variables for the 1983-2008 period. Estimates of the differ-
ent spatial coefficients are both economically and statistically significant. The magnitude
of strategic behavior appears to be largest for the maximum and effective benefit levels.
Estimates suggest that states respond to a 10% cut in the average benefit level of the their
neighbors with an own cut of around 9.3%. When allowing for asymmetric responses, I find
states are slightly more responsive to cuts in neighbors benefits when their own benefit level
is above the weighted average of their neighbors. Though not conclusive evidence, the finding
of asymmetries suggests the strategic interaction found is likely due to competitive behavior
rather than other phenomenons noted in the literature (yardstick competition, copy-catting,
common intellectual trend) or some geographically correlated omitted variable. Or, as stated
by Figlio et. al (1999), it appears that “states are more concerned about being left-ahead in
welfare benefit levels than they are about being left behind.” Strategic policy setting over the
effective benefit level is also detected and indicates states respond to a 10% cut in neighbor
effective benefits with an own cut of 7.5% Evidence of competition over the effective benefit
suggests states could be strategically using polices such as family caps, partial sanctions,
and financial incentives to keep the actual benefits they pay in line with their neighbors.
This finding implies there may exist competition over the benefit base as well as the level.
Moving onto the tax rate results, I find that a 10% cut in the effective tax rate on earned
income by states’ neighbors is met with an own state reduction of approximately 8%.
Interestingly, the asymmetrical responses to neighbors’ effective tax rates on earnings
are much larger and economically important than those found for benefits. While at first
one might suspect states engaged in competition would increase effective tax rates in order
26Estimates are robust to the use of multiple lag structures (see sensitivity analysis).
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to reduce overall generosity, this is not necessarily the case.27 Cuts in the effective tax rates
coinciding with falling benefits would not do much to increase overall state welfare generosity
(especially if one was not working or receiving non-labor income). Instead, one should view
the falling effective tax rates on earned income as use of ‘carrot’ policies by states to lure
recipients to the labor market and eventually off welfare. In some sense, the results suggest
states are ‘racing to force recipients back to work’. A state that finds itself employing an
effective tax rate on earned income greater on average than its neighbors, will match a 10%
cut in neighbors benefits with a own cut of roughly 9%. However, if that same state was
instead employing an effective tax rate lower than its neighbors, it will only match a 10%
cut with and own cut of 6.7%. Put another way, while states may ‘race along’ with their
neighbors in promoting work, they slow at the prospect of leading this race or being overly
generous.
Table 3a and 3b present results for the three separate welfare regimes. While the
full period analysis established evidence of competitive behavior, results produced for this
period could mask changes in state behavior occurring after the onset of the waiver period
or the 1996 structural shift in the welfare system. For both benefit variables, evidence of
competition is found across all three periods. Point estimates suggest benefit competition
grew stronger over wavier and TANF periods. For instance, during the AFDC regime,
estimates suggest states respond to a 10% cut in the maximum benefit level of their neighbor’s
with an own cut of 6.9%. This magnitude increases to roughly 9.5% , and 8.7% for the
waiver and TANF periods, respectively. However, when coefficients are tested for equality
across periods, I fail to find evidence that they are statistically different from one another.
Interestingly, when asymmetries are included, evidence of asymmetrical responses for the
maximum benefit level is only found during the TANF era. The effective benefit displays
a very similar pattern with asymmetrical responses detected in both the waiver and TANF
regimes. With the effective tax rate on earned income, evidence of competition is only found
for the AFDC and TANF era. The finding that states implemented very similar tax rates
to those of their neighbors under AFDC is perhaps unsurprising given that all states were
subject to the same statutory tax rates under this regime. Differentials in state effective tax
rates arose primarily due the differences in sources and levels of income disregards permitted
by each state. With the onset of the waiver period, states began to experiment by altering
their statutory rates and offering further financial incentives. The estimate of strategic policy
setting for this period suggests that they did so at first without paying much attention to
the policies of bordering states. However under TANF it appears state’s did strategically
27Falling effective tax rates appears to be the dominant trend in the data making a discussion of “race to
the bottom” under this scenario more useful.
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set policies impacting their effective tax rates. Furthermore, the evidence of important
asymmetrical responses are only found for the TANF era. These finding suggests several
things. First, my previous findings of behavioral asymmetries for the full period were most
likely driven by the wavier and TANF periods. Second, after welfare reform, states appear
to place more importance on their relative position to their neighbors as one might expect
if competition was intensifying.
Table 4 presents the results for the final three welfare variables - ease of access,
sanction use, and non-sanction state policy. Again, these variables are meant to proxy policy
dimensions not captured by the four main policy instruments and are only analyzed for the
TANF period. States appear to exhibit strong behavioral responses to their neighbors’
approval rates or ‘ease of access’ to welfare benefits. Specifically, in the model without
asymmetrical responses, it appears a state reacts to a 10% cut in the weighted average of their
neighbors approval rate with an own cut of 7.7%. Setting restrictive access policy could prove
ideal for policy makers wishing to offer relatively generous benefits to the worst off without
attracting migration. In fact, the inclusion of asymmetries into the model reveals the finding
that states already offering more restrictive access relative to their neighbors’ respond much
stronger to changes in neighbor’s policy. The magnitude of the spatial coefficient for states
offering relatively more restrictive access is actually double that of the spatial coefficient for
their less restrictive counterparts. In other words, if competition is in fact the force behind
this strategic behavior, then states choosing to compete through access compete fiercely.
The same story holds for the sanction and non-sanction state policy variables. This finding
is different from the behavior observed over the first four variables. The race to the bottom
story consistent with those results was one in which states behave strategically with the goal
of keeping their policies in line with those of their neighbors rather that attempting to surge
ahead. For the later three variables this is not the case.
b. Dynamic Results
Table 5 presents the results for the full period dynamic specification. As one would expect,
the lagged dependent variables are highly significant across all policy instruments. Further-
more, they appear to be a principle factor determining a state’s policy for the current year. In
fact, once controlling for last year’s maximum benefit level, all evidence of strategic responses
to neighbor policy for this variable disappears (at least for the time frame in question). An
explanation for the stark contrast between static and dynamic results is simply that in the
case of the maximum benefit level, neighbors benefits are serving as a proxy for own state
benefit level. Once controlling for state dependence, neighbors’ benefits no longer appear
important or, put another way, it no longer appears that states are setting their maximum
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benefit level strategically. Strategic behavior over the effective benefit level and effective
tax rate on earned income remains in the dynamic framework though the spatial coefficients
are now reduced in magnitude. The short run effect of a 10% cut in the average effective
benefit levels of neighboring states leads to an own state reduction of 2.3%. In the long run
however, this responsiveness grows to nearly 7.8 %. For the effective tax rate, the short run
response to a 10% cut by neighbors is an own cut around 3.2% while the estimated long
run coefficient is approximately 6.2%. Strong evidence of asymmetries are again detected
for both the effective benefit variable and tax rate offering further evidence of competition.
Analyzing the three welfare periods separately reveals further evidence of important
strategic interaction as well as several interesting patterns. Table 6a presents the results
for the benefit variables, and 6b, the results for the effective tax rate. For the maximum
benefit guarantee, statistically significant spatial coefficients are only found in the TANF era
(and only for the model including asymmetrical responses). However, evidence of strategic
interaction does presents in the long run estimates for all three periods suggesting that states
may not have set benefit policy simultaneously but they did adjust benefits based upon their
neighbors’ policies over time. Furthermore, the long run coefficients grow larger across the
different periods displaying the same pattern detected in static estimates. Another clear
pattern is the growing persistence is state welfare policies. The coefficient on last year’s
benefits hovered around .76% during the AFDC period and then increased to over .9 in
the TANF regime. Strategic behavior in setting the effective benefit level is more apparent.
Though statistically significant spatial coefficients are not found until the TANF period,
evidence of strategic behavior over a longer run as well as asymmetrical responses manifest
in both the waiver and TANF periods.28Taken together these findings suggest the intensity
of strategic behavior over the maximum and effective benefit level grows when moving ahead
to the post reform period.
For the effective tax rate, I again find evidence of strategic behavior in both the
AFDC and TANF periods but not during the waiver era. Asymmetries are also detected in
the periods where strategic behavior occurred and appear to be of clear economic importance
during TANF. Specifically, when failing to allow for asymmetrical responses one finds a state
responds to a 10% cut in the average effective tax rate of neighbors with an own cut of 1.2%.
However, once asymmetries are modeled it appears this behavior occurs mainly among states
offering relatively higher tax rates on earned income. These states will match a 10% cut in
28The long run coefficients obtained in the TANF period are greater than one indicating an explosive pattern
of interaction. This could be taken as evidence of a non-stable equilibrium. Spatial coefficients in excess of
one have not been uncommon is the welfare competition literature (See figure 4). However, stationarity for
spatial dynamic panels requires |α| ≤ 1− φWmax if φ ≥ 0 or that the sum of the spatially and temporally
lagged dependent variable is < 1 and thus estimates should be viewed with caution.
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neighbors benefits with and own reduction of over 5% while states already offering lower than
average tax rates appear unresponsive. This suggests states are strategically manipulating
policy parameters used to provide better work incentives. The persistence in the effective
tax rates implement by states also appears to be increasing across the periods.
Lastly, Table 7 presents the results for the remaining three variables. Of these,
sanction use and non-sanction state policy continues to exhibit evidence of short-run strategic
policy setting once dynamics are incorporated. Both the approval rate and sanction use
appear to be highly persistent as seen by their sizable coefficients on the lagged dependent
variables. Overall results parallel those found in the static analysis again suggesting that
states already ahead of their neighbors on average in the use of sanctions and non-sanction
state policy are the most responsive to neighbor policy changes.
7. Sensitivity Analysis
This section presents the results of several sensitivity analyses to explore the robustness of
baseline results. Specifically I investigate the sensitivity of the estimation results to the
(i) specification of alternative weighting schemes and (ii) different lag structures on the
instruments.
a. Alternative weighting schemes
I compare baseline estimates that used contiguous states as neighbors with those obtained
from the two additional weighting schemes. The first of these continues to assign noncon-
tiguous states a weight of zero but scales the weight given to contiguous states by population.
In this case, ωijt = popjt/
∑
j∈Ji popjt, where Ji is the set of states bordering state i. Because
population changes over time, weights will now vary by year. The population weighting
scheme is motivated by the notion that when looking to neighbors, state’s may place greater
importance on those with large populations as they likely have a larger pool of potential
welfare migrants. The final weight matrix, WIII, is a distance matrix. Here, the off-diagonal
elements ωij are equal to (1/dij)/
∑
j∈Ji(1/djk) where dij is the distance in kilometers be-
tween state centroids if dij is less than 1000 kilometer and zero otherwise. Under this scheme
states consider the policies of a wider set of geographic neighbors. For simplicity I focus on
the four main variables over the full 1983-2008 period. Results for both the static and
dynamic models are presented in Table 8. Overall, results appear robust across the three
weight matrices though some variations do exist. In the static model, I find moving from the
contiguity weighting scheme to the population based weighting scheme reduces the spatial
coefficient on the maximum benefit from .926 to .804, or by approximately 13%. Using the
inverse distance matrix reduces the spatial coefficient by another 8% and results in a loss of
20
statistical significance suggesting states are most responsive to the maximum benefit levels
set by their immediate neighbors. These results are therefore more consistent with neigh-
boring states engaged in strategic policy setting than states simply following a regional or
national trend. A similar story holds for the static effective benefit level results. Estimates
for the effective tax rate appear to be the most robust to the choice of weight matrix with
estimates ranging from .703-.790. For the dynamic specifications, the past finding of no short
run strategic policy setting over the maximum benefit level continues to hold. Interestingly,
some evidence of strategic policy setting is detected over the long run - but only when the
inverse distance matrix is used. Finally, for the effective benefit level and tax rate, dynamic
estimates appear robust to the weight matrix choice. Long run estimates tend to be largest
under the inverse distance weighting scheme suggesting that while states are may be more
responsive to contiguous neighbors in the short run, over time they are influenced by regional
and national trends.
b. Different lag structures on the instruments
As previously discussed, the finite sample size of this analysis requires one to restrict the
potential instrument set. Baseline estimates were obtained by instrumenting the spatial vari-
able with its second through fourth lags collapsed. As a robustness check, Table 9 presents
estimates for the full period static and dynamic models obtained with several alternative
instrument choices (these include using more lags and starting with the third lag rather
than the second). The top panel of the table contains to static spatial coefficient estimates
while the the bottom panel contains the short run (SR) spatial coefficient estimates from the
dynamic model as well as the calculated corresponding long run (LR) estimates. Point esti-
mates appear fairly robust to alternative lag structures. The efficiency of different instrument
sets appears to be more variable specific. 29
8. Conclusion
Using a new spatial econometric approach, this analysis has examined interstate welfare
competition over the old AFDC regime, the waiver period, and the first decade of the
new TANF era. The estimates suggest that interstate competition was present across all
three periods and strongest during the wavier and TANF periods. Long run estimates,
which allow for states to adjust to their neighbor’s policies over time, are also largest in the
waiver and TANF era consistent with a race to the bottom after welfare reform. The results
obtained for the effective benefit level and tax rate suggest strategic policy setting occurs
29Hansen J-tests for over identifying restrictions suggest that any of the chosen lag combinations produce
valid instruments.
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in both the benefit level and base. Moreover, response asymmetries indicate states appear
more concerned about being relatively generous than relatively stingy when compared with
neighbor’s in the provision of benefits and work incentives. Lastly, estimates for the approval
rate, sanction use, and non-sanction state policy imply states also strategically set policies
affecting the extensive margin of program generosity. Interestingly, response asymmetries
found for the approval rate, sanction use, and non-sanction state policy indicate states
competing on these margins may want to be leaders in the “race to the bottom” rather
than just staying in line with neighbor’s as was the case with the effective benefit and tax
rate. Together, the sizable spatial coefficient found in the static analysis and the long run
coefficients produced from the dynamic specifications suggest strategic policy setting was an
important factor behind downward trends in welfare generosity.
The fact that states appear highly responsive to the welfare policies of their neighbors
may pose cause for concern in today’s fiscal climate. Motivated by looming budgetary
problems, many states have had to enact deep cuts in their welfare programs. According to
a report produced by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, in 2011 alone at least five
states including California, Washington, New Mexico, South Carolina, and the District of
Columbia cut their monthly benefit levels in a substantial way.30 For instance, Washington’s
monthly benefit for a family of 3 was slashed by $84 dollars while South Carolina’s dropped
by 20% to $217 - an amount corresponding to only 14% of the federal poverty line. At the
same time, multiple states adopted shorter or more restrictive time limits and cut financial
work incentives. California, for instance, cut its time limit from 60 to 48 months and reduced
their $225 earning’s disregard to $112. Michigan tightened its time limit and scaled back
its refundable EITC (partially funded by TANF) from 20% of the federal credit to only 6%.
Results from the empirical analysis are consistent with states strategically responding to
policy changes such as these suggesting we may see a continued reduction in the generosity
of state welfare programs.
30Schott and Pavetti (2011)
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Figure 4. Survey of welfare competition empirical strategies 
Author 
(Date) 
Data/years Dependent Variable Main 
Weight 
Matrix 
Model/Estimation technique Spatial 
Coefficient 
Estimates (ρ)  
Dahlberg & Edmark 
(2008) 
281 Swedish 
Municipalities  
1989-1994 
Benefit Expenditure per 
recipient 
contiguity 𝐵𝑡 =  𝜌𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛿𝑊𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 ; IV 
 
.648-1.519 
Figlio et. al  (1999) Continental U.S. 
1983-1994 
Combined maximum 
AFDC and Food Stamp 
benefit for family of 3 
Based on 
state to state 
migration 
flows 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝛥𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝛥𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡        & 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝛥𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝛥𝑋𝑡 + 𝜌𝛥𝑊𝐵𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ; 
IV 
.904-1.314 
Fiva & Rattso  (2006) 433 Norwegian 
Municipalities in 1998 
Expected welfare benefit 
of standardized recipient, 
benefit norm for 1  
contiguity   𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 ; 
 IV & reduced form 
 
.36-.81 
Saavedra (2000) Continental U.S. 
1985, 1990, 1995 – 
separate cross section & 
pooled 
Maximum AFDC benefit 
for family of 3 
contiguity 𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 ;  
reduced form 
 
.21-1.35 
Rom et. al 
(1998) 
Continental U.S. 
1976-1994 
Maximum AFDC benefit 
for family of 4 
contiguity 𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 ; reduced 
form 
.274 
  Table notes: All reported coefficients are statistically significant at 90% confidence level. 
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acceptance rate
62.56 - 96.73
55.56 - 62.56
45.80 - 55.56
13.02 - 45.80
 Figure 6a: Acceptance Rate (2000-2008) 
sanctions
16.67 - 35.26
8.59 - 16.67
3.06 - 8.59
0.00 - 3.06
 Figure 6b: Percent Distribution of Cases Closed by Sanction (2000-2008) 
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7.28 - 11.42
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Full Period 
(1983-2008) Benefit and Tax Rate Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
 
     Maximum Benefit for Family of  3 1248 523.36 202.35 
 Effective Benefit for Family of  3 1248 482.65 201.72 
 Effective Tax Rate on Earned Income 1248 27.23 17.03 
AFDC 
(1983-1991) Maximum Benefit for Family of  3 432 616.55 222.69 
 Effective Benefit for Family of  3 432 599.67 212.55 
 Effective Tax Rate on Earned Income 432 37.58 13.23 
Wavier Period 
(1992-1996) Maximum Benefit for Family of  3 240 528.22 184.48 
 Effective Benefit for Family of  3 240 514.09 176.2 
 Effective Tax Rate on Earned Income 240 34.95 12.71 
TANF 
(1997-2008) Maximum Benefit for Family of  3 576 451.44 160.5 
 Effective Benefit for Family of  3 576 381.79 143.49 
 Effective Tax Rate on Earned Income 576 16.25 14.31 
Additional Welfare Variables  
TANF only 
    (2000-2008) % of cases closed by sanction 432 11.13 11.51 
 % of cases closed by state policy 432 12.78 10.53 
 Approval  rate 432 55.47 19.33 
Control Variables (1983-2008) 
Full Period 
(1983-2008) population in 1000s 1248 3320.21 2692.72 
 African American proportion of population 1248 9.83 9.65 
 median wage 1248 16.14 1.76 
 poverty rate 1248 12.85 3.85 
 per capita employment 1248 48.04 3.59 
 female unemployment rate 1248 3.17 0.99 
 democratic governor 1248 0.5 0.5 
 
Table 2.  Static panel GMM estimates of neighbor’s reaction function for alternative welfare policy instruments, full period (1983-2008) 
 
Policy 
Instrument: 
 
Maximum Benefits 
 
Effective Benefits 
 
ETR on Earned Income 
𝜙WYp 0.926** 
  
0.745*** 
  
0.779*** 
 
 
(0.420) 
  
(0.283) 
  
(0.241) 
 
 𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) 
  1.028*** 
  
0.843*** 
  
0.988*** 
 
 
(0.381) 
  
(0.233) 
  
(0.288) 
𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) 
  1.014** 
  
0.815*** 
  
0.666** 
  (0.382) 
  
(0.234) 
  
(0.275) 
         Wald-test for Asymmetries 
 
8.12 
  
10.36 
  
11.37 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)    p-value 
 
0.007 
  
0.002 
  
0.002 
         
         Observations 1248 1248 
 
1248 1248 
 
1248 1248 
         AR (1) p-value 0.402 0.376 
 
0.172 0.112 
 
0.002 0.0003 
AR (2) p-value 0.769 0.420 
 
0.045 0.048 
 
0.947 0.466 
         
Hansen’s  J-statistic 5.418 8.499 
 
10.08 13.06 
 
11.98 
14.03 
 
p-value 0.862 0.668 
 
0.433 0.289 
 
0.286 0.231 
No. of instruments 44 46 
 
44 46 
 
44 46 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 denotes policy response to neighbors in model with no asymmetries. For asymmetry model, 
𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) /𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) denote responses of states with policy values greater than/less than their neighbor's on average. All spatial variables are instrumented with 
their second through forth lags collapsed.  
 
 
Table 3a. Static panel GMM estimates of neighbor’s reaction function for alternative welfare policy instruments by welfare period 
 
Policy instrument is Maximum Benefit 
 
Policy instrument is Effective Benefit 
 
AFDC 
 
Wavier 
 
TANF 
 
AFDC 
 
Wavier 
 
TANF 
𝜙WYp 0.694* 
  
0.959*** 
  
0.867*** 
  
0.853*** 
  
0.907*** 
  
0.934*** 
 
 
(0.358) 
  
(0.221) 
  
(0.303) 
  
(0.266) 
  
(0.252) 
  
(0.234) 
 
                  𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) 
 
 
0.769** 
  
0.934*** 
  
1.200*** 
  
0.932*** 
  
1.059*** 
  
0.975*** 
  
(0.376) 
  
(0.244) 
  
(0.241) 
  
(0.339) 
  
(0.246) 
  
(0.158) 
𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) 
 
 
0.761** 
  
0.905*** 
  
1.179*** 
  
0.918*** 
  
1.038*** 
  
0.922*** 
  
(0.375) 
  
(0.250) 
  
(0.238) 
  
(0.335) 
  
(0.241) 
  
(0.163) 
                  Wald-test for Asymmetries 1.97 
  
1.89 
  
4.53 
  
3.69 
  
3.82 
  
5.91 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)    p-value 
 
0.167 
  
0.175 
  
0.039 
  
0.061 
  
0.057 
  
0.019 
                  Observations. 432 432 
 
240 240 
 
576 576 
 
432 432 
 
240 240 
 
576 576 
                  AR(1) p-value 0.982 0.820 
 
0.441 0.377 
 
0.355 0.442 
 
0.591 0.944 
 
0.150 0.647 
 
0.169 0.0539 
AR(2) p-value 0.211 0.241 
 
0.779 0.911 
 
0.702 0.692 
 
0.707 0.645 
 
0.154 0.401 
 
0.0743 0.128 
                  Hansen’s J-statistic 1.927 6.178 
 
4.335 7.137 
 
6.736 10.28 
 
5.354 9.877 
 
2.928 11.35 
 
10.84 17.36 
p-value 0.997 0.939 
 
0.931 0.895 
 
0.750 0.671 
 
0.866 0.704 
 
0.983 0.582 
 
0.370 0.183 
No. of instruments 27 31 
 
23 27 
 
30 34 
 
27 31 
 
23 27 
 
30 34 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All non-dummy variables are in logs. 𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 denotes policy response to neighbors in model with no asymmetries. For  
asymmetry model, 𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) /𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) denote responses of states with policy values greater than/less than their neighbor's on average. 
 
 
 Table 3b. Static panel GMM estimates of neighbor’s reaction function for alternative welfare policy instruments by welfare period 
 
Policy instrument is ETR on earned income 
 
 
AFDC   Wavier   TANF 
 𝜙WYp 0.843*** 
  
0.486 
  
0.624*** 
  
 
(0.266) 
  
(0.614) 
  
(0.214) 
  
          𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) 
 
 
0.923*** 
  
0.882* 
  
0.906*** 
 
  
(0.261) 
  
(0.485) 
  
(0.178) 
 𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) 
 
 
0.833*** 
  
0.776* 
  
0.459** 
 
  
(0.247) 
  
(0.452) 
  
(0.215) 
 
          Wald-test for Asymmetries 2.58 
  
2.12 
  
11.92 
 (𝜙0 = 𝜙1)    p-value 
 
0.115 
  
0.15 
  
0.001 
 
          Observations. 432 432 
 
240 240 
 
576 576 
 
          AR(1) p-value 0.001 0.021 
 
0.149 0.175 
 
0.005 0.002 
 AR(2) p-value 0.036 0.010 
 
0.202 0.270 
 
0.850 0.872 
 
          Hansen’s J-statistic 6.216 14.25 
 
6.376 9.642 
 
8.150 11.22 
 p-value 0.797 0.356 
 
0.783 0.723 
 
0.614 0.592 
 No. of instruments 27 31 
 
23 27 
 
30 34   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 denotes policy response to neighbors in model with no asymmetries. For  
asymmetry model, 𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) /𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) denote responses of states with policy values greater than/less than their neighbor's on average. All 
spatial variables are instrumented with their second through forth lags collapsed. 
 
 
 
 Table 4. Static panel GMM estimates for neighbor’s reaction function for addition welfare policy 
instruments, TANF only (2000-2008) 
 
Approval Rate 
 
Sanction Use 
 
Non-Sanction State 
Policy 
𝜙WYp 0.765* 
  
0.202 
  
0.254 
 
 
(0.464) 
  
(0.466) 
  
(0.320) 
 
         𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) 
 
 
0.940** 
  
1.161*** 
  
0.578* 
  
(0.371) 
  
(0.288) 
  
(0.333) 
𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) 
 
 
1.916*** 
  
-0.277 
  
0.111 
  
(0.672) 
  
(0.346) 
  
(0.334) 
         Wald-test for Asymmetries 5.89 
  
24.18 
  
7.32 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)    p-value 
 
0.01 
  
0.00 
  
0.009 
         
         Observations 432 432 
 
432 432 
 
432 432 
        AR (1) p-value 0.712 0.101 
 
0.0139 0.00336 
 
0.143 0.0167 
AR (2) p-value 0.171 0.814 
 
0.568 0.448 
 
0.298 0.424 
         Hansen’s J-statistic 5.308 11.66 
 
14.15 13.64 
 
5.434 9.920 
p-value 0.870 0.556 
 
0.166 0.399 
 
0.860 0.700 
No. of instruments 27 31 
 
27 31 
 
27 31 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 denotes policy response to neighbors 
in model with no asymmetries. For asymmetry model, 𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) /𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) denote responses of states 
with policy values greater than/less than their neighbor's on average.  All non-dummy variables are in logs.  
 
 
Table 5. Dynamic panel GMM estimates of neighbor’s reaction function for alternative welfare policy instruments, full period (1983-
2008) 
Policy Instrument: Maximum Benefits 
 
Effective Benefits 
 
ETR on Earned Income 
𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 0.095 
  
0.234** 
  
0.320** 
 
 
(0.107) 
  
(0.116) 
  
(0.161) 
 
         𝜙0𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
 
0.040 
  
0.275* 
  
0.442* 
  
(0.089) 
  
(0.163) 
  
(0.249) 
𝜙1𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
 
0.044 
  
0.249 
  
0.365* 
  
(0.088) 
  
(0.163) 
  
(0.213) 
𝛾𝑌𝑝,𝑡−1 0.857*** 0.902*** 
 
0.699*** 0.506*** 
 
0.486*** 0.438*** 
 
(0.094) (0.088) 
 
(0.095) (0.123) 
 
(0.106) (0.157) 
         Long Run Coefficients 
        𝜙/(1 −  𝛾) or  𝜙0/(1−  𝛾)  0.667 0.406 
 
.777*** 0.557** 
 
.622** .787*** 
 
(0.574) (.730) 
 
(0.285) (0.282) 
 
(0..296) (0.312) 
         𝜙1  /(1−  𝛾)  
 
0.447 
  
0.504* 
  
0.649* 
  
(.713) 
  
(0.286) 
  
(0.346) 
  
        Wald-test for Asymmetries 1.42 
  
15.28 
  
0.33 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)    p-value 
 
0.234 
  
0.000 
  
0.567 
AR (2) p-value 0.389 .234 
 
0.780 0.788 
 
0.208 0.241 
Observations 1200 1200 
 
1200 1200 
 
1200 1200 
Hansen’s J-statistic 9.198 7.984 
 
6.176 6.492 
 
9.301 17.54 
p-value 0.604 0.786 
 
0.861 0.889 
 
0.594 0.130 
No. of instruments 45 47   45 47   45 47 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All non-dummy variables are in logs. Spatial variables and lagged dependent 
variable are instrumented with collapsed lags from at least 2 periods earlier. 
 
Table 6 a. Dynamic panel GMM estimates of neighbor’s reaction function for alternative welfare policy instruments by welfare period  
 
Policy instrument is maximum benefit 
 
Policy instrument is effective benefit 
 
AFDC 
 
Waiver 
 
TANF 
 
AFDC 
 
Waiver 
 
TANF 
𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 0.181 
  
0.114 
  
0.129 
  
0.118 
  
0.189 
  
0.331** 
 
 
(0.137) 
  
(0.126) 
  
(0.086) 
  
(0.127) 
  
(0.157) 
  
(0.162) 
 
                  𝜙0𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (𝐼𝑖𝑡) 0.162 0.136 0.153* 0.178 0.130 0.330** 
  (0.160)   (0.172)   (0.089)   (0.161)   (0.159)   (0.159) 
𝜙1𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
0.163 
  
0.135 
  
0.151* 
  
0.175 
  
0.125 
  
0.301* 
  
(0.155) 
  
(0.173) 
  
(0.088) 
  
(0.157) 
  
(0.160) 
  
(0.156) 
                  γYp,t−1 0.768*** 0.763*** 
 
0.884*** 0.844*** 
 
0.940*** 0.919*** 
 
0.795*** 0.705*** 
 
0.786*** 0.837*** 
 
0.746*** 0.595*** 
 
(0.117) (0.170) 
 
(0.116) (0.142) 
 
(0.050) (0.043) 
 
(0.252) (0.265) 
 
(0.128) (0.130) 
 
(0.121) (0.159) 
Long Run Coefficients 
                𝜙/(1 − 𝛾) or 0.780 0.681* 
 
.983*** .876** 
 
2.155 1.890* 
 
.579 0.602 
 
0.873** .799* 
 
1.303*** .817*** 
𝜙1/(1 − 𝛾) (0.538) (0.385) 
 
(0.385) (0.453) 
 
(1.674) (1.119) 
 
(.759) (0. 400) 
 
(0.457) (0.474) 
 
(0.386) (0.268) 
                  𝜙1/(1 − 𝛾)  
 
0.687* 
  
.870* 
  
1.860* 
  
0.594 
  
0.77 
  
.744*** 
  
(0.368) 
  
(0.471) 
  
(1.104) 
  
(0.399) 
  
(0.493) 
  
(0.284) 
                  Wald-test for Asymmetries 0.04 
  
0.02 
  
0.61 
  
4.1 
  
2.14 
  
4.16 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)     p-value 
 
0.848 
  
0.879 
  
0.435 
  
0.043 
  
0.143 
  
0.0414 
                  Observations 384 384 
 
240 240 
 
576 576 
 
384 384 
 
240 240 
 
576 576 
AR (2)  p-value 0.431 0.455 
 
0.344 0.418 
 
0.933 0.987 
 
0.836 0.813 
 
0.818 0.634 
 
0.750 0.800 
Hansen’s J-statistic 15.25 17.62 
 
11.72 16.18 
 
16.18 16.67 
 
14.96 16.84 
 
17.35 19.12 
 
24.18 27.35 
p-value 0.645 0.673 
 
0.861 0.759 
 
0.580 0.731 
 
0.184 0.265 
 
0.500 0.577 
 
0.149 0.160 
No. of instruments 35 39 
 
31 35 
 
39 43   28 32 
 
31 35 
 
39 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All non-dummy variables are in logs. Spatial variables and lagged dependent variable are instrumented with collapsed 
lags from at least 2 periods earlier. 
  
Table 6b. Dynamic panel estimation results for the effective tax rate by welfare period 
 
Policy instrument is ETR on earned Income 
 
AFDC   
 
Waiver   
 
TANF   
𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 0.593** 
  
0.167 
  
0.118 
 
 
(0.258) 
  
(0.425) 
  
(0.167) 
 
         𝜙0𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (𝐼𝑖𝑡) 0.545** 0.402 0.479** 
  (0.225)   (0.307)   (0.233) 
𝜙1𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡)  0.472**   0.333   0.138 
  (0.227)   (0.303)   (0.211) 
         γYp,t−1 -0.186 -0.036 
 
0.740*** 0.457* 
 
0.808*** 0.445*** 
 
(0.179) (0.088) 
 
(0.276) (0.241) 
 
(0.265) (0.134) 
Long Run Coefficients 
        𝜙/(1 −  𝛾) or  𝜙0/(1−  𝛾)  0.450** .526** 
 
.640 .740 
 
.617 .863*** 
 
(0.251) (0.224) 
 
(1.687) (.672) 
 
(.606) (0.341) 
         𝜙1/(1 −  𝛾)  
 
0.456** 
  
.613 
  
0.248 
  
(0.225) 
  
(.637) 
  
(0.361) 
Wald-test for Asymmetries         
 
6.08 
  
2.04 
  
6.91 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)   p-value 
 
0.014 
  
0.15 
  
0.009 
         Observations 384 384 
 
240 240 
 
576 576 
AR (2) p-value 0.040 0.063 
 
0.158 0.223 
 
0.413 0.471 
Hansen’s  J-statistic 12.20 18.39 
 
12.36 19.70 
 
12.74 28.65 
p-value 0.837 0.624 
 
0.828 0.540 
 
0.311 0.123 
No. of instruments 35 39 
 
31 35 
 
32 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All non-dummy variables are in logs. 
 Spatial variables and lagged dependent variable are instrumented with collapsed lags from at least 2 periods earlier. 
 
 Table 7. Dynamic panel GMM estimates of  neighbor’s reaction function for the approval rate, 
sanction use, and non-sanction state policy, TANF only  (2000-2008) 
 
Approval Rate 
 
Sanction Use 
 
Non-Sanction State 
Policy 
𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 0.034 
  
0.168 
  
0.009 
 
 
(0.135) 
  
(0.294) 
  
(0.165) 
 
         𝜙0𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
0.121 
  
0.596* 
  
0.495* 
 
 
(0.160) 
  
(0.308) 
  
(0.266) 
𝜙1𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
0.298 
  
-0.011 
  
-0.055 
  
(0.229) 
  
(0.217) 
  
(0.277) 
 
        γYt−1,p 0.832*** 0.722*** 
 
0.823*** 0.676*** 
 
0.254 0.115 
 
(0.075) (0.119) 
 
(0.187) (0.160) 
 
(0.258) (0.273) 
Long  Run Coefficients 
         𝜙/(1 −  𝛾) or  𝜙0/(1−  𝛾) .200 0.434 
 
.949 1.842* 
 
0.012 0.559* 
 
(.818) (0.629) 
 
(1.927) (.984) 
 
(0..222) (0.304) 
         or  𝜙1/(1 −  𝛾) 
 
1.072 
  
-0.033 
  
-0.062 
  
(0.833) 
  
(.669) 
  
(0313) 
         Wald-test for asymmetries 2.24 
  
5.53 
  
6.90 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)   p-value 
 
0.141 
  
.023 
  
0.012 
         Observations 336 336 
 
336 336 
 
336 336 
AR (2) p-value 0.116 0.0805 
 
0.448 0.754 
 
0.266 0.616 
Hansen’s J-statistic 14.05 14.04 
 
19.83 26.20 
 
20.23 27.16 
p-value 0.781 0.900 
 
0.405 0.243 
 
0.381 0.205 
No. of instruments 35 39 
 
35 39 
 
35 39 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All non-dummy variables are in logs. Spatial 
variables and lagged dependent variable are instrumented with collapsed lags from at least 2 periods earlier. 
 
Table 8. Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative weight matrix specifications for static and dynamic models 
Static Models 
Policy Instrument: Maximum Benefit 
 
Effective Benefit 
 
ETR on Earned Income 
Weight matrix WI WII WIII 
 
WI WII WIII 
 
WI WII WIII 
            
𝜙WYp 0.926** 0.804* 0.739  0.745** 0.442 0.541  0.779*** 0.703** 0.790* 
 
 
 
(0.420) (0.444) (0.531)  (0.290) (0.331) (0.421)  (0.241) (0.268) (0.436) 
Hansen's J-statistic 5.418 3.542 7.160 
 
10.08 9.743 8.185 
 
11.98 13.34 14.22 
p-value 0.862 0.966 0.710 
 
0.433 0.463 0.611 
 
0.286 0.205 0.163 
number of instruments 44 44 44 
 
44 44 44 
 
44 44 44 
Dynamic Models 
 
Maximum Benefit 
 
Effective Benefit 
 
ETR on Earned Income 
 
WI WII WIII 
 
WI WII WIII 
 
WI WII WIII 
 
𝜙WYp 
 
0.095 0.041 0.152 
 
0.234** 0.179 0.256 
 
0.320** 0.299* 0.517** 
 
(0.107) (0.124) (0.119) 
 
(0.116) (0.110) (0.163) 
 
(0.161) (0.161) (0.223) 
            𝛾Yp,t−1 0.857*** 0.900*** 0.879*** 
 
0.699*** 0.792*** 0.716*** 
 
0.486*** 0.520*** 0.461*** 
 
(0.094) (0.063) (0.089) 
 
(0.095) (0.101) (0.111) 
 
(0.106) (0.086) (0.108) 
            Long Run Coefficients 0.667 0.406 1.256* 
 
.777*** 0.860* .900* 
 
0.622** 0.623* .959*** 
𝜙/(1 −  𝛾)  (0.574) (1.142) (.656) 
 
(0.285) (0.473) (0.450) 
 
(0.295) (0.327) (0.370) 
            Hansen's J-statistic 8.204 8.381 8.041 
 
3.109 7.236 6.201 
 
9.301 8.700 8.101 
p-value 0.695 0.679 0.710 
 
0.989 0.780 0.860 
 
0.594 0.650 0.704 
number of instruments 45 45 45 
 
45 45 45 
 
45 45 45 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  WI is main contiguity matrix, WII is contiguity matrix scaled by population and WIII is inverse distance 
matrix. All other specification choices are the same as those used in baseline full period models.  
Table 9. Sensitivity analysis of  spatial coefficient to alternative instrument lag structures  
(full period ) 
Static Model 
  
Maximum Benefit 
 
Effective Benefit 
 
ETR on Earned 
Income 
2nd through 3rd lags 0.928** 
 
.775** 
 
0.758*** 
  
(0.462) 
 
(0.342) 
 
(0.271) 
2nd through 4th lags  0.926** 
 
.745** 
 
0.779*** 
  
(0.420) 
 
(0.290) 
 
(0.241) 
2nd through 6th lags  0.949** 
 
.761*** 
 
0.661** 
  
(0.390) 
 
(0.270) 
 
(0.260) 
3rd through 5th lags  0.965** 
 
1.037** 
 
0.702* 
  
(0.391) 
 
(0.426) 
 
(0.355) 
3rd through 7th lags  0.880** 
 
1.016** 
 
0.678* 
  
(0.342) 
 
(0.430) 
 
(0.341) 
4th through 6th lags  1.040** 
 
1.066 
 
0.683** 
  
(0.408) 
 
(0.783) 
 
(0.326) 
4th through 8th lags  0.976** 
 
1.049 
 
0.682** 
  
(0.389) 
 
(0.658) 
 
(0.327) 
Dynamic Model 
 
  
 SR LR  SR LR  SR LR 
2nd through 3rd lags  0.084 .620 
 
0.241* .797** 
 
0.308* .606* 
  
(0.112) (.653) 
 
(0.131) (.315) 
 
(0.169) (.316) 
2nd through 4th lags  0.095 .667 
 
0.234* .777*** 
 
0.320** .622** 
  
(0.110) (.588) 
 
(0.119) (.292) 
 
(0.165) (.406) 
2nd through 6th lags  0.083 .542 
 
0.281** .920*** 
 
0.397*** .732*** 
  
(0.428) (2.373) 
 
(0.136) (.316) 
 
(0.144) (.264) 
3rd through 5th lags  0.021 .202 
 
0.421* 1.02*** 
 
0.349*** .677** 
  
(0.110) (.991) 
 
(0.214) (.354) 
 
(0.171) (.333) 
3rd through 7th lags  0.0622 .491 
 
0.439* 1.086*** 
 
0.445** .823** 
  
(.113) (.697) 
 
(0.229) (.375) 
 
(0.169) (.329) 
4th through 6th lags  0.150 .883 
 
0.465* 1.208*** 
 
0.449*** .813*** 
  
(0.117) (.613) 
 
(0.236) (.318) 
 
(0.153) (.289) 
4th through 8th lags  0.132 .894 
 
.434 1.243*** 
 
0.446** .803*** 
  
(0.126) (.744) 
 
(0.243) (.375) 
 
(0.154) (.286) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **P<0.05, *p<0.1. Only spatial coefficients are 
reported. SR denotes short run coefficients and LR denotes long run coefficients. 
 
